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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FREDERICK MAY & CO., INC.
a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
W. PRESCOTT DUNN and
TRACY COLLINS TRUST
COMPANY, a Banking
Corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9356

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FACTS
The plaintiff in this case is a broker who procures and arranges sales of business properties.
It is a corporation whose business is all conducted
by its President, Mr. Frederick May. In the interest
of simplifying we will generally in this brief refer
to Mr. May and use the pronoun "he" when referring to the plain tiff.
In April, 1953 Mr. May entered into a contract with defendant-respondent, W. Prescott Dunn,
wherein Mr. May would attempt to find a pur1
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chaser for, and negotiate the sale of Keith O'Brien
Company, vvhich was owned by Mr. Dunn, At the
same time, at the request of Mr. Dunn, Tracy Collins Trust Company, the co-defendant in this case,
became associated as a co-broker (R. 26), to work
with Mr. May in negotiating a sale of the capital
stock of the said corporation. This agreement provided for a $25,000.00 broker's fee, to be divided
evenly between the two brokers, in the event of a
sale procurred and arranged by them, said division
to be after first deducting plaintiff's expenses
(Dunn Dep. p. 3).
In the next few years, Mr. May made contacts
and conducted negotiations all over the United
States, which were to no avail and which have
nothing to do with this case.
It was in May, 1954 that Mr. May first contacted Sperry and Hutchinson Company, who later
bought the Keith O'Brien Company in the transaction which gives rise to this lawsuit. Mr. May
knew that the S. & H. Company, best known for
their Green Stamps, often invests in retail businesses, either buying them and operating them outright or backing other parties who buy in their own
name. Mr. May knew of one Guberman who had
previously bought a store with S. & H. backing.
Therefore, he contacted S. & H., as well as Guberman, to let them know he was looking for a buyer
for Keith O'Brien (May Dep. p. 7).
2
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S. & H. did not commit themselves in any way
at this time, except to say they did not want to back
Guberman. However, in February or March of 1956,
an official of S. & H. came to Salt Lake City and
looked over the Keith O'Brien properties. They
assumed the roll of backer for one Riordan, whom
Mr. May had negotiated with unsuccessfully two
years previously. Now it appeared Riordan was
interested again; S. & H. was willing to put up
50 1o or so of the money; and, since Mr. May had
contacted S. & H. before, he was notified by Dunn
that he should again con tact S. & H. and arrange
for meetings, etc. to work out a deal. Thus, extensive and continual negotiations were carried on between Mr. May and S. & H., both in New York
City and in Salt Lake City, until approximately
June, 1956. At this time talks were broken off as
substantially all the ground had been covered. (May
Dep. p. 16-24)
Soon after this, S. & H. apparently resumed
negotiations with Mr. Dunn, to the exclusion of Mr.
May, and a contract for the sale of the business
to S. & H. Company was concluded on July 27, 1956.
(R. 16)
Four days subsequent to this, on July 31, 1956,
Dunn telephoned Mr. May in New York City to tell
him that he had decided not to sell the business after
all, but would rather keep most of the stock him3
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self, and turn part of it over to a brother-in-law.
(May Dep. p. 26, Dunn Dep. p. 28, 29)
In this conversation, Dunn offered to give Mr.
May $5,000.00 merely as a token of appreciation
for services rendered and expenses incurred in his
behalf over several years. Then he asked Mr. May,
inasmuch as no sale would be made, to send Dunn
a letter terminating their agency contract and acknowledging receipt of the $5,000.00, as payment in
full for all services rendered, etc. Only later did
Mr. May learn that at the time he wrote that letter
and agreed to accept the $5,000.00 as a token payment, a sale had alre'ady been made to S. & H.,
with whom he had been negotiating all along. (May
Dep. p. 26)
At the time the sale was made by Dunn to S.
& H., Mr. May was excluded from the deal. Apparently, however, Mr. May's co-broker, Tracy Collins Trust Company, was not excluded, since following the conclusion of the sale, the seller, Mr. Dunn,
paid Tracy Collins Trust Company a commission
of $11,000.00. (Dunn Dep. p. 37)
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The plaintiff was never told of the sale of
Keith O'Brien to S. & H. until it was told to him
some time later by a third party. At that time he
filed the original complaint (R. 1). After filing
4
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this complaint, information became available to the
plaintiff which made it necessary to file an amended
com plaint ( R. 9) . An answer was filed to this
amended complaint ( R. 15). In this answer were
admissions as to dates, etc., which once again made
it necessary for the pl'aintiff to amend his pleadings but, before doing so, he instigated discovery
procedures, to find what more information might
be available which would be relevant to the filing
of correct pleadings. In this discovery procedure,
depositions were taken from the plaintiff, Mr. May,
and the defendant, Mr. Dunn. These depositions are
substantially the only evidence in the record at this
point, and they will from time to time be referred
to in this brief. They will be referred to by title and
page, since the pages in the deposition have not
been assigned page numbers in the record. Following the taking of the depositions, a second amended
complaint was filed (R. 2'5), to which in due time
answers were filed by the defendant, W. Prescott
Dunn (R. 34), and the co-defendant, Tracy Collins
Trust Company (R. 39). A motion for a summary
judgment was filed by defendant Dunn ( R. 4'9) and,
in connection therewith, a memorandum in support
of defendant's motion for summary judgment (R.
53-72). This motion came on for hearing before
the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr. of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
5
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State of Utah. Pursuant to that hearing, the motion
for summary judgment was granted and a judgment of dismissal was rendered (R. 73). Following
the entry of this summary judgment, the co-defendant, Tracy Collins Trust, filed a similar motion
and memorandum in support thereof, which came
on for hearing before the Honorable A. H. Ellett of
the Third Judicial District Court. Pursuant to that
hearing, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, and so the plaintiff's claim against
defendant, Tracy Collins Trust, is still before the
District Court, pending trial. The plaintiff appealed
the summary judgment, which was granted in favor
of defendant, W. Prescott Dunn. In this appeal the
appellant urges the court that the summary judgment entered by the court below should be reversed,
and the case should be remanded for a trial of the
issues, on the grounds and for the reasons set forth
in this brief.
STATEMEN'T OF POINTS
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED BECAUSE:
I.

THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS.
A.

WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE AGENCY CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT?

B.

WAS

THE

AGENCY

CONTRACT EVER

6
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CHANGED OR REVOKED BY THE DEFENDANT OR ABANDONED BY THE PLAINTIFF?
C.

II.

WAS THE PLAINTIFF THE "PROCURING
CAUSE" OF THE SALE?
1.

WAS PLAINTIFF'S CONTACT WITH
THE OFFICERS OF THE BUYER THE
CAUSE OF THEIR BECOMING INTERESTED IN BUYING?

2.

IN WHAT CAPACITY DID S. & H. NEGOIATE FOR THE SALE - BACKER OR
BUYER?

3.

AFTER THIS SALE TO S. & H., WAS A
COMMISSION PAID TO THE BROKER,
TRACY COLLINS TRUST COMPANY?

THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

THE DEFENDANT DID NOT AND COULD
NOT REVOKE THE AGENCY CONTRACT
WITHOUT LIABILITY FOR THE AGREED
COMMISSION.

B.

PLAINTIFF WAS THE "EFFICIENT" OR
"PROCURING" CAUSE OF THE SALE TO
S. & H.
1.

IT MATTERS NOT THAT THE BUYER
ASSUMED THE ROLE OF "BACKER"
THROUGH MOST OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

2.

PLAINTIFF DID NOT AT ANY TIME
"ABANDON" HIS EFFORTS WITH S.
& H.
7
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ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGlVIENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED BECAUSE:
I. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL
FASTS; and II. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states the requirement for the rendering of a
summary judgment as follows:
The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
We will argue in this brief that there are in
the case several genuine issues of material facts
which will be specifically treated. We will endeavor
to convince the Court that a reasonable jury could,
from the evidence on file find in favor of the plaintiff-appellant in each disputed question. (See Ulibarri v. Christensen, 2 U. 2d 367, 275 P 2d 170)
We will argue that if the disputed questions of fact
were viewed favorably to the plaintiff, then the
defendant would not be entitled to a judgment as
a m'atter of law, but rather, the plaintiff would be
so en ti tied.
The court is asked to consider all of the facts
presented and every inference fairly arising there8
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from in the light most favorable to the appellant in
accordance with the rule stated in Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 U. 289, 259 P 2d 297.
I. A. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE AGENCY
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND THE
DEFENDANT?

In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued that the agreement between the defendant-principal and the plaintiff-agent was clearly a "General Listing", as distinguished from "An
Exclusive Agency" or an "Exclusive Right to Sell".
It argued then further that a general listing is
"revoC'able at the will of the owner in good faith, at
any time before performance" (R. 54). Having
said this, he states then, "It, therefore, follows that
the defendant Dunn was free to make a sale to a
purchaser without liability for commission, unless
the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale"
(R. 55).
The agency contract in this case is apparently
purely oral, and therefore, difficult of proof ( R. 55) .
Agreements generally between principals and brokers have a tendancy to be vague in form, and are
often subjects of dispute. When there is such a dispute, and it is material to the determination of the
case, the dispute must be resolved by a trial of the
facts. These things are questions for a jury. As
said in 1 Corbin on Contracts, p. 150,
9
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Gaps must be filled by that uncertain process called implication, a mixture of determining the meanings of the parties by interpretation of their words and actions, and of
doing justice according to the mores and practices of the community.
It is by no me'ans clear, as defendant claims
(R. 55) that this agency contract "is no exclusive
agency or exclusive right to sell". In Mr. May's
deposition as quoted at R. 55, he was asked:
Q. Did you consider that this agreement
that you had with Mr. Dunn gave you an
exclusive license or an exclusive right to make
the sale or not make the sale?
A. I would say, on a moral basis, yes,
but I wouldn't say that he just outright agreed
we were his exclusive agents. But the inferences were very clear on his part and Mr.
Collins' part.
In other words, Mr. M'ay could not remember
any specific reference to or guarantees of "exclusive
agency", etc., but he definitely testified that the inferential flavor of the whole transaction was that
Mr. May and his co-brokers were to be exclusive
agents.
This oral agreenment was had in May, 19S3.
It is somewhat vague. However, there is available
to a trier of fact the evidence of the actions and
words of the parties for a subsequent three-year
period, which must be considered, along with the
mores and practices of the community, in order to
10
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arrive at a determination of the nature of the contract.
Thus, it is urged that reasonable men could
differ as to the nature of the agency contract in
this case, and ~a trial of the facts must be had to
determine the question.
I. B. WAS THE AGENCY CONTRACT EVER
CHANGED OR REVOKED BY THE DEFENDANT, OR
ABANDONED BY THE PLAINTIFF?

There seems to be no question of the fact that
in 1953 the plaintiff and the defendant entered into
an agency agreement, whereby plaintiff was promised a certain commission if and when he should
find a buyer and negotiate a sale of the capital
stock of Keith O'Brien. There is a question, however, as to the nature of that agreement (discussed
supra, Point I A). There is, then, also a question
as to whether plaintiff was the "procuring cause"
of the sale to S. & H. (infra, I C). If either or
both of these major questions should be answered in
favor of the plaintiff, then there would still be the
question considered now. That is, given that there
was an agency contract and that pursuant thereto
the plaintiff came into contact with the buyer, etc.,
then the defendant seems to suggest that the plaintiff is neverthless not entitled to a commission because at some timely point the agency contract was
terminated by the defendant, or else abandoned by
the plaintiff.
11
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The law concerning this point is discussed at
II A, infra. It is, in essence, that regardless of which
category of agency agreements this one falls into, it
cannot be revoked after the agent has substantially
performed his part of the agreement. Furthermore,
it can only be revoked by notice to the agent of the
principal's intention to revoke (see citations, etc.
in II A).
It is somewhat difficult to discuss this question because it doesn't appear clear just what defendant's position on it is. Perhaps defendant means
to imply that the agreement was revoked in March,
1956 at the time defendant asked Mr. May to contact S. & H. and represent him in negotiations with
them. In other words, perhaps a jury would be asked
to believe that Mr. Dunn's intended meaning was
something like this: "Now, Mr. May, you have not
found a buyer and our agreement is revoked. Now,
I have found one and I would like you to contact
them for me and negotiate with them, for which I'll
perhaps pay you a fee at some future time."
There is no evidence in the record at this point
to indicate that anything like this was understood
by the parties. If something like this is intended
by the defendant's position then it would have to
be developed in a trial of the facts. As argued in
I C, infra, a more reasonable interpretation would
be that the defendant's "direction" of Mr. May to
12
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contact S. & H. was a recognition that Mr. May had
talked to them before and that they were now showing increased interest and he should follow up with
them.
Perhaps defendant means to argue that the
agency contract was revoked in June, 1956. At that
time negotiations between S. & H. and Riordan
on one side and Mr. May, Tracy Collins and the
defendant on the other side were concluded. Perhaps the defendant is claiming that he then decided to revoke the agency con tract and go ahead
and sell the business on his own. It would be reasonable, however, for a jury to hold that at this point
Mr. May had already done about all there was to
do in bringing either or both of the prospective
buyers to a sale and that he, therefore, had "performed" his part of the agreement and defendant
could not then legally revoke without liability for
a commission. Besides, no notice of any intended
revocation was given at this time so that any purported revocation would be invalid. (See 1 Corbin
on Contracts 153)
Finally, the defendant did give notice of revocation on July 31, 1956. On that date Mr. May agreed
to a termination of the agency contract and to accept a token fee payment. However, this agreement
on Mr. May's part was procurred through the fraudulent misrepresentation by defendant that the busi13
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ness would not be sold, whereas, in fact, it had already been sold four days before to one of the two
prospective buyers that Mr. May had been working
with all along. (See May Dep. p. 26 and Dunn Dep.
p. 28)
Thus, it is the plaintiff's position that the
agency contract was never terminated and that,
since the plaintiff was the "procuring cause" of the
sale (as argued infra) he is entitled to the payment
of the agreed commission.
There is, then, the further question of whether
the plaintiff ever abandoned his employment. The
defendant contends at R. 69 that he did following
the conclusion of negotiations in June, 1'956. In support of this contention, defendant quotes from Mr.
May's deposition on page 26 thereof, where he said:
"That ended it as far as I was concerned with S.
& H."
The plaintiff has two answers to this contention: First. even in view of the apparent finality of
the quoted statement of Mr. May, when taken out
of con text, the totality of his testimony does not
supply enough for any court to hold as a matter
of law that Mr. May had "abandoned" his employment as an agent.
Secondly, if a jury should be convinced that Mr.
May had actually come to a decision that he must
abandon all further efforts with S. & H., then it
14
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is plain tiff's contention that the evidence would show
that he was brought to that decision through fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the defendant, or S. & H., or both. The pleadings and depositions show that it was only a relatively few days
between the concluding of negotiations and the signing of a deal by S. & H.
In other words, Mr. May was led to consider
S. & H. only as a backer and then to believe that a
deal would not be made because of insurmountable
difficulties. For these reasons he went home. Then,
almost immediately, without his knowledge, S. & H.
was suddenly signing on the dotted line.
The plaintiff contends there must be a jury
trial to consider the evidence of the defendant's lack
of good faith in bringing about a situation which
he now relies on as "abandonment" by the plaintiff.
(See discussion of law on this point in II B, infra)
I. C. (1) WAS PLAINTIFF'S CONTACT WITH THE
OFFICERS OF THE BUYER THE CAUSE OF THEIR
BECOMING INTERESTED IN BUYING?

In the memorandum supporting defendant's
motion for summary judgment the defendant
stresses the claimed fact that Mr. May was not the
first one to contact S. & H., and that his first contact with S. & H. was later, at the direction of Mr.
Dunn. This does not appear from the record as
claimed. On the contrary, Mr. May's deposition, in15
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eluding the parts quoted in defendant's memorandum, indicate that Mr. May's first contact with
S. & H. was prior to any instructions from the defendant. The answers to interrogatories quoted by
defendant at R. 57 also bear this out. Interrogatory
No. 1 asked what date Mr. May first contacted
S. & H. The answer was that Mr. May contacted
Morris Guberman in May, 1954, and then:
At that time Mr. Guberman sought financial assistance from S. & H. to enable him
to purchase this stock. Within a very short
time thereafter Mr. Frederick May spoke to
the then President of Sperry and Hutchinson
Company, regarding the availability of financing for Mr. Guberman in his proposed purchase of the capital stock of Keith O'Brien.
(R. 57)
The testimony of Mr. May, in his deposition
(May Dep. p. 7, 8) also makes it clear that Mr.
May first spoke to an officer of S. & H. in 1954.
S. & H. had no contact with Mr. Dunn personally
relative to this sale until March, 1956 (May Dep.
p. 16).
The conclusion seems inescapable, then, that
the Sperry and Hutchinson Company, who ultimately became the buyers, were first interested in the
property and first learned that the business was
for sale through the efforts of the plaintiff.
There is some conflict in the evidence before
the court at this point, as to whether Mr. May
16
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called the President of S. & H., or vice versa. However, this writer cannot see that it makes any difference. It makes no n1ore difference than if S. & H.
had become ·aware that Keith O'Brien was for sale by
reading an advertisement instigated by the plaintiff, and then calling the plaintiff. In other words,
that is the nature of the efforts and methods of
agents in such transactions. They undertake to
spread the word among appropriate parties that a
property is for S'ale. Very often the party who ultimately becomes the buyer is not approached cold
by the agent, but rather hears of the deal through
the agent's other feelers or contacts, and then contacts the agent. Perhaps that is what happened here.
The point i·s that the court could not be sure
at this point. There is not enough evidence in the
record for any court to decide as a matter of Jaw
that the plaintiff did not "find" the buyer. Indeed,
what evidence is in the record suggests strongly that
he did. However, there is other evidence which should
be considered. A jury should hear the testimony
of the officers of S. & H. themselves, as to when and
how they first became aware of ·and interested in
the possible purchase of Keith O'Brien, and their
undestanding as to the role played by Mr. May
throughout the transaction.
The defendant also places great emphasis on
the fact that defendant "directed" Mr. May to con17
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tact S. & H. in 1956. This is apparently supposed
tq be conclusive evidence that Mr. May's previous
contact with S. &. H. (R. 57) was completely in...
operative in introducing S. & H. to the idea of
purchasing Keith O'Brien. To complete the picture
(which defendant does not do) we are apparently
asked to interpret that Mr. Dunn had "found" the
buyer and he asked Mr. May to represent him in
talks with S. & H., merely as some kind of an errand
boy. His employment for this purpose was apparently to be completely separate from the original agency
contract, although no agreement was made concerning pay for these services, etc.
We suggest to the court that a more reasonable
interpretation is that Mr. Dunn had in mind the
original agency agreement, and he knew Mr. May
had talked with S. & H. before, and so he ·asked Mr.
May to continue to represent him according to that
agreement, by contacting S. & H. again and negotiating with them and anyone else they might wish
to associate with for ·a purchase. In other words,
when S. & H. expressed to Dunn in 1956 an interest
in a deal, and asked for financial statements, etc.
Dunn asked Mr. May to go and see them. A jury
could reasonably interpret this as 'an admission on
the part of Dunn that he still had a valid agency
contract with Mr. May, and that May had talked
with S. & H. before; therefore, May was given in18
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structions to go ahead and negotiate a sale, as per
the agency contract.
The important point to all of this is that it is
a question for a jury. This point is part of the larger
question of procuring cause. As stated in 8 Am. Jur.
1088:
When a broker is the procuring cause of
a sale it is a question of considerable difficulty; in the main it is a question of fact for
a jury, the decision in each case being depenedent upon the particular facts and circumstances thereof. (See Rose v. Hunter, 317
P. 2d 1027 (Cal.) and Carpenter v. Francis,
319 P. 2d 497 (Colo.) and Shelton v. Tafley,
329 P. 2d 672 (Okla.) )
I. C. (2) IN WHAT CAPACITY DID S. & H. NEGOTIATE FOR THE SALE - BACKER OR BUYER?

A great deal of defendant's case seems to rest
on the alleged fact that throughout all the negoti'ations in which Mr. May participated, S. & H. was
only a prospective backer, or financier of someone
else, (R. 62). This is supposed to mean, then, that
since Mr. May only considered them a backer and
not a prospective purchaser in their own right, his
negotiations with them could have nothing to do
with their becoming sole purchaser a few days after
his last meeting with them. The law concerning this
question will be considered below in point II B. Our
purpose here is to contend that irrespective of the
law on the point, there is a rna terial question or
19
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perha,ps ,, sever~l questions of fact which should be
considered by a jury.
The evidence in the record is claimed by the defendant to prove that S. & H. played the role of
backer for someone else right up to June, 1956.
However, the question is: Did they play that role
in good faith? Also, was the defendant acting in
good faith in purporting to believe them?
The plaintiff contends that evidence offered
at a trial of the facts will show that S. & H. entertained the possibility of buying the property outright, if a favorable deal could be worked out, right
from the first contact with Mr. May, or if not right
at first then surely very early in his negotiations
with them.
Plaintiff does not know at this point what the
evidence will show as to the good faith of the defendant, Dunn, or of the co-broker, Tracy Collins Trust,
but the jury should consider the question as to
whether they or either of them honestly and reasonably believed that S. & H. had no interest in buying
outright.
If the jury believed in defendant's good faith
up to the breaking off of negotiations, then it would
still be reasonable to hold he did not act in good
faith when he failed to call Mr~·· May back when
S. & H. suddenly reappeared as the buyer a few
days later.
20
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It is relevant, in assessing defendant's good
faith, to consider that when defendant did next contact Mr. May, it was after the sale was made and
for the purpose of inducing him through fraudulent
misrepresentation to terminate the agency contract
and accept a token payment. (May Dep. p. 26)
I. C. (3) AFTER THE SALE TO S. & H., WAS A
COMMISSION PAID TO THE CO-BROKER, TRACY
COLLINS TRUST COMPANY?

We must briefly call attention to the question
as to the nature of the payment of $11,000.00 to
Tracy Collins Trust Co. The defendant claims that
this payment was a voluntary payment for this and
other services Tracy-Collins had rendered in the
past (Dunn Dep. p. 37). Plaintiff contends that a
jury would reasonably hold that this payment was
a payment of commission for the sale of Keith
O'Brien, substantially in line with the amount agreed
in the original agency agreement between Dunn and
the co-agents, May and Tracy-Collins. Thus, TracyCollins was paid as agreed and Mr. May was not.
In other words, it is plaintiff's contention that
this payment of a commission to Tracy Collins constitutes an admission on the part of the defendant
that a broker's commission was owing on the sale
of Keith O'Brien. Yet, there is nothing to show
why the agreed commission (or very close to it) was
paid to Tracy Collins, while a much smaller token
21
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amount was paid to its co-broker, May. It is claimed
that Mr. May is not en ti tied to the agreed commissi"on because he was not the "procuring cause" of
the sale. This, based on the argument that he did
not contact S. & H. first, etc. However, there is no
claim anywhere that Tracy Collins was the "procuring cause". There's no claim that Tracy Collins
foundS. & H. They were not even actively working
on the soliciting of buyers (May Dep. p. 5) .
The point is that this is another very important
item of the case, about which there is a dispute which
ought to be resolved by a jury.
II. A. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT AND COULD
NOT REVOKE THE AGENCY CONTRACT WITHOUT
LIABILITY FOR THE AGREED COMMISSION.

We argued in point I A that one of the m·aterial
issues of fact is whether the agency contract in this
case is a "general listing", an "exclusive agency"
or an "exclusive right to sell". Now, however, it
is argued that even if a jury were to hold that this
agency contract was in the nature of a "general
listing", and thus revocable, then according to the
law, even as argued by defendant at R. 54, the defendant is still liable for the agreed commission.
This, on the grounds that the defendant's revocation was not "in good faith" and did not take place
"at any time before performance". (Tetrick v. Sloan,
339 P. 2d 613 ( 1959) at page 617). Also, it was not
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effected by a notice of revocation to the plaintiff.
We read at 1 Corbin on Contracts 15'3 a discussion of this type of agency contract and the following:
Here the only contemplated contract between the owner and the broker is a unila tral
con tract - a promise to pay a commission
for services rendered. Such an offer as this
is revocable by the owner by notice before
the broker has rendered any part of the requested service; possibly also before he has
rendered a substantial part of the service.
A sale by the owner to a third party, with no
notice thereof to the broker, is certainly not
operative as a revocation. (emphasis ours)
In a good many cases of this kind it has
been held that the owner is no longer privileged to revoke his offered promise after the
broker has taken substantial steps in the process of rendering the requested service, by
advertising the property for sale, sol'ici ting
prospective buyers, showing the property or
otherwise ; in such a case, the revocation and
discharge of the broker is held to be a breach
of con tract. (See cases cited in notes of this
section.)
Mr. May contacted the ultimate buyer in this
case and negotiated with it over many months, right
down to a date within only a few days of the date
the transaction was completed (May Dep. p. 16-24).
It is apparently during those few days between the
time Mr. May finished up the negotiations with
the buyer and the time of the ·actual closing of the
23
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deal that the defendant now purports to have revoked the agency con tract and made the sale on his
own, although no notice of such revocation was given
Mr. May at that time. Thus, Mr. May, the agent,
had already performed, according to the agency
agreement. He had found a buyer and conducted
negotiations with that buyer right up to just before
the signing on the dotted line. Furthermore, defendant's purported revocation was not in good faith,
since it was done for the sole purpose of taking advantage of plaintiff's services, while depriving him
of his agreed commission. (See Patterson v. Blair,
25'7 P. 2d 944 (Utah)). It is significant in this regard that plaintiff wa:s not notified of the revocation until after the sale had been made, and then he
was falsely told no sale was going to be made. Thus,
according to the law, as stated in Corbin on Contracts and quoted above, the defendant in this case
did not effectively revoke the agency agreement
until after the sale was completed, since notice to
the agent is necessary to revoke such an agreement.
It is for a jury to determine after consideration of the evidence whether defendant acted in
good faith in going ahead with the sale without
plaintiff's knowledge as this question bears on defendant's right to revoke the agency contract without liability for a commission. (See cases: Sill v.
Ceschi, 167 Cal. 698, 140 P. ·949 and White v. Reskin,
90 Cal. App. 512, 265 P. 1016.
24
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II. B. PLAINTIFF WAS THE "EFFICIENT" OR
"PROCURING" CAUSE OF THE SALE TO THE BUYER.
(1) IT MATTERS NOT THAT THE BUYER ASSUMED
THE ROLE OF "BACKER" THROUGH MOST OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS.

The law concerning the right of a broker to a
commission upon the sale of property is really very
simple. All of the cases and other authorities generally set up a formula which contains two rules or
requirements. Then all the cases involve applying
the facts to this standard. There are many cases
in the books because the variety of factual situations
in this type of a case is infinite. Most of the citations of the defendant, in connection with its motion for summary judgment, expressed the general
rule mentioned above, and which the plaintiff readily
accepts.
As a good example, let us quote from the case
of Hayutin v. DeAndrea, 237 P. 2d 383, from which
the defendant quotes at length at R. 64:
First. Before the broker can be said to
have earned his commission, he must produce
a purchaser who is ready, willing and able
to purchase the property, upon the terms and
at a price designated by the principal.
Second. The broker must be the efficient or procuring cause of the sale. The means
employed by him and his efforts must result
25
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in the sale. He must find the purchaser, and
the sale must proceed from his efforts acting
as broker. (Babcock v. Merritt, 1 Colo. app.
84, 27 p. 882.) (See also Van Leewen v. Huffaker, 74 U. 441,280 P. 235.)
Thus we see that the two rules or requirements
which must be met for a broker to receive a commission are: 1. He must produce a purchaser who
is ready, willing and able to purchase, and 2. The
sale must proceed from his efforts acting as broker.
By way of qualification or explanation of the second
of these two rules, the court in that same case quoted
from 12 C.J.S. page 209 (See R. 64), as follows:
While it is not essential that the broker's
efforts be the sole cause of the sale or other
transaction, it is essential that they be the
predominating effective cause, and they are
not sufficient to entitle him to a commission
where they are merely an indirect, incidental
or contributing cause, or one of the links in
a chain of causes.
There is nothing in the law, as quoted above,
nor in any of the cases pre sented which say by any
stretch of interpretation that the broker does not
get a commission if the buyer he produces, and who
buys through his efforts, posed as a backer rather
than a buyer during some of the negotiations.
There is one great and overwhelming fact in
this case which, all by itself, could reasonably be held
to make completely irrelevant any of the evidence
26
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that S. & H. posed as a backer during its negotiations with the plaintiff. This one imrortant fact is
the fact that S. & H. did buy the property in question. This is particularly so when it is shown that
they bought only a few days following the end of
a long period of negotiations conducted by the plaintiff in his capacity as broker for the defendant.
This, then, is absolutely conclusive proof that the
first rule suggested above was complied with. In
other words, it is completely obvious that S. & H.
was ready, willing and able to buy the property
because, in fact, they did buy the property. (See
Hudgens v. Caraway, 55 N.M. 458, 235 P. 2d 140)
In many cases involving this type of question
the plaintiff has a different problem of proof and
argument. The plaintiff is often attempting to prove
that he found a buyer who was ready, willing and
able to buy, and then that he negotiated with that
buyer and brought him to the point of sale, and that
he, therefore, is en ti tied to a commission, even though
the defendant seller sold the property to someone
else. If the case at bar were that type of a case,
then the fact of S. & H.'s posing as backer instead
of buyer would be very material, in fact it would
be almost impossible for an agent to prove that he
had a buyer who was ready, willing and able to
buy in the face of evidence that the party he had
procured was never considered as a buyer, but only
27
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as ~ backer. However, in this case, all of that difficulty has been obviated by the fact that the party
which the plaintiff claims to have 'brought forward
actually was the buyer.
The rest of the question is purely a question
of fact. In other words, we know we had a party
who was ready, willing and able to purchase, because they did purchase. The only thing remaining
is requirement No.2, the question as to whether this
purchaser was found by this plaintiff, and whether
the sale proceeded from this plaintiff's efforts. This
is purely a question of .fact, which has already been
discussed in this brief at point I C supra. (See
Steele v. Seth, 172 A 2d 338 at 39'2 (Md.), Thornton
v. Forbes, 326 Mass. 308, 93 N.E. 2d 742 at 744,
Buckholz v. Gorsuch, 144 Md. 62, 124 A 389, Heslop
v. Dieudonne, 120 A 669 (Md.) at 672).
None of the cases cited by the defendant, in connection with his motion for summary judgment,
states any rule of law contrary to this. Each of these
cases is greatly distinguishable from the instant
case on its facts. In the first case cited at R. 63,
Hayutin v. DeAndrea, 237 P. 2d 383, the plaintiff
agent was claiming a commission because he participated in the negotiations leading up to a sale,
but he lost because it was admitted in that case
that the plaintiff had absolutely nothing to do with
the finding or introducing of the buyer. In the case
28
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at bar the plaintiff claims to be in a position to
prove that he did "find" and introduce the buyer.
(See point I C supra) . In the second case cited by
the defendant, that of Wood v. Hutchinson Coal Co.,
176 F. 2d 682, the plaintiff claimed a commission
because he brought the buyer in contact with the
seller, but he lost because the evidence showed in
that case that, at the time the said introduction
was made, there was nothing for sale, and the introduction had nothing to do with the property which
was only much later put up for sale by the seller.
In the instant case, the plaintiff ,claims to have been
the first to contact the ultimate buyer, specifically
with regard to the sale of the subject property, at
a time when that property definitely was up for
sale.
In the case of Clarke v. Ellsworth, 184 P. 2d
821, cited at R. 65, the agent lost because the buyer
became aware that the property was for sale completely independently of the agent; in fact, before
the property had even been listed with the agent
and the buyer then contacted the seller and negotiated a sale, completely independent of the agent.
In our case, however, the plaintiff claims that 'a
reasonable jury would find that the buyer was introduced to the sale by the plain tiff, and that the
plaintiff was the efficient cause of his being brought
to the point of sale.
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In the case of Nelson v. Mayer, 265 P. 2d 52,
quoted at R. 67, suffice it to say that the transactions in that case went through a long and complicated chain of events and people which have no
resemblance whatsoever to the facts of the case
at bar.
In conclusion, the plaintiff contends that none
of the cases relied upon by the defendant in his
motion for summary judgment could be held to
supply the District Court with authority to hold,
as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was not the
"procuring cause" of the sale upon which he claims
a right to the agreed commission.
II. B. (2) ABANDONMENT.

There is the further question of abandonment
on the part of the agent. Again with respect to this
question, we must simply admit and agree to the
existence of the rule stated by the defendant. We
must then, however, respectfully point out that the
question as to whether the particular agent has
abandoned his employment is a question for the jury,
unless the pleadings and evidence in the record admit of only one conclusion, which is not true here.
We will, then, attempt to show how the cases relied
upon by the defendant, in seeking a summary judgment in the court below, are distingishable on their
facts from the case at bar.
The rule with respect to abandonment on the
30
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part of a broker is quite well summarized in 8 Am.
Jur. 1069, Brokers Section 144. This section was
quoted in the case of Withers v. Sohrweid, 257 P. 2d
267. This case and the said section of American
JHrisprudence quoted therein were quoted by the defendant at R. 69. For convenience, we will present
it again here :
If a broker, after introducing a prospective customer to his employer to no purpose,
abandons his employment entirely, or if, after
procuring a person who proves to be unwilling
to accept the terms of his principal, he merely
ceases to make further endeavors to negotiate a deal with that particular individual and
all negotiations in that direction are completely broken off and terminated, he will not
be entitled to a commission if his employer
subsequently renews negotiations with the
same person either directly or through the medium of another agent, and thus effects a
sale without further effort on the part of the
broker first employed.
A few lines below this quotation at 8 Am. Jur.
1069, the following is stressed:
The question as to when the broker will
be deemed to have abandoned his efforts to
sell depends upon the facts of the individual
case. The mere fact that some time elapses
after the broker has discontinued his efforts
to make a sale before the sale is made in fact
by the owner is not evidence of itself that
there has been complete abandonment of the
negotiations.
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By way of a further brief clarification· of the
rule, let us present one more brief quotation from
the case of Real Estate Enterprises v. Collins, 256
S. W. 2d 286 (Mo.), also cited and quoted from
by the defendant at R. 70, 71:
. . . Where there is a definite break in
the continuity of the negotiations amounting
to an abandonment of the deal and new forces
thereafter enter which bring about a renewal
of the negotiations and themselves become the
effective cause of the sale, the initial efforts
may not then be regarded as the proximate
procuring cause . . . (emphasis ours)
... All this came about without any pretence of fraud or lack of good faith on the
part of defendants. What happened was that
long, long after plaintiff's agency had expired,
defendants renewed the negotiations and succeeded in bringing about a sale, which was
referrable, not to the negotiations which had
been oarried on while plaintiff's contract was
in force, but to the efforts of defendants which
were initiated after plaintiff's contract was
term ina ted. (emphasis ours)
Thus, the rule becomes clear; if an agent abandons his efforts with a prospective buyer, and the
seller renews negotiations with that buyer and makes
a sale, the agent can be deprived of his commissions,
but only if some new forces have entered the picture, which new forces become the effective cause
of the sale, or if the new negoti~ations and the sale
are consummated after the termination of the
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agent's agency contract. Furthermore, all this must
happen without any claim or evidence of fraud or
lack of good faith on the part of the defendant principal.
Thus, we point out the distinctions between the
cases cited by the defendant and the case at bar.
The evidence in this case does show that, following
the conclusion of negotiations some time in June
of 1956, the plaintiff did not have occasion to contact the buyer any more. However, there is no showing of any new forces entering the picture, which
could be shown to have supplanted the efforts of the
plaintiff as the efficient cause of the sale. Furthermore, we have already argued at point I Band II A,
that the agency contract was never terminated until
after the sale had been completed. In addition to
this, the claim is made by the plain tiff, and there is
a strong inference from the evidence in the record,
that there was a lack of good faith in all of this
on the part of the defendant, Among other things,
such an inference of lack of good faith could be
made from the misrepresentations made by the defendant to the plaintiff at the time the plaintiff was
induced to terminate the agency contract, after the
sale to S. & H. had been made (See Dunn Dep. page
28 & 29 and May Dep. p. 26).
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the appellant urges the court to
find that there are in the case genuine issues of
material fact, as outlined herein, and therefore,
that the defendant-respondent was not entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law, but rather a trial
of the issues should be had to determine the facts
in the case, for this reason, the judgment of the
District Court should be reversed, and the the case
should be remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
WHITE, ARNOVITZ, & SMITH
Attorneys for Appellant
913 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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